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Lay theory research on intergroup relations has rapidly grown over the past two decades.
Drawing on articles in this Special Issue, we showcase the latest developments. First, we define
lay theories, addressing the extent of overlap with scientific theories and differences among lay
theories in terms of type of representation, level of articulation, frequency of activation and
use, range of applicability, and degree of universality. Second, we describe advances in the
understanding of the functions of lay theories. Third, we review the far-reaching implications of
lay theories for group and intergroup processes. Fourth, we discuss the movement toward
comparing and contrasting related lay theories. Taken together, these articles suggest the study
of lay theories provides a fuller understanding of intergroup relations.
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PEOPLE’S perceptions are filtered through and
guided by their lay theories (e.g. Fletcher, 1995;
Furnham, 1988; Gelman, 2003; Wegener &
Petty, 1998; Yzerbyt, Judd, & Corneille, 2004).
Work on lay theories is an abundant area of
research as indicated by a recent PsycINFO
search ( June 27, 2005), showing a total of 882
records indexed with the following terms: ‘lay
theory’, ‘implicit theory’, ‘naïve theory’, or
‘folk theory’. Examining the abstracts of these
records, we discerned a clear increasing trend
over the last two decades in the number of
papers concerning lay theories and intergroup
relations, broadly defined to include work on
stereotyping, prejudice, discrimination and
group differences as a function of age, gender,
race, and culture. A review of the abstracts also
revealed the study of a diverse set of lay theories
such as essentialism (e.g. theory about the core
qualities of a group, Haslam, Rothschild, &
Ernst, 2000, 2002; Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron,
1997), entitativity beliefs (e.g. theory about
what defines a group, Lickel, Hamilton, &
Sherman, 2001; Yzerbyt, Rogier, & Fiske, 1998),
incremental versus entity theories (theories
about the malleability vs. fixedness of human
attributes, e.g. Hong, Chiu, Yeung, & Tong,
1999; Levy, Stroessner, & Dweck, 1998), Protes-
tant work ethic (theory that hard work leads to
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success, e.g. Crandall, 1994; Levy, Freitas, &
Salovey, 2002), and belief in a just world
(theory that people deserve what they get and
get what they deserve, e.g. Lerner, 1970;
Montada, 1998). This work has shown that lay
theories can reliably relate to people’s stereo-
typing, prejudice, and discrimination toward
members of groups including racial and ethnic
groups (e.g. Katz & Hass, 1988; Levy et al.,
1998), national groups (e.g. Hong et al., 1999;
Kashima et al., 2005), gay men and lesbians
(e.g. Biernat, Vescio, & Theno, 1996; Haslam
et al., 2002), women (e.g. Crandall & Martinez,
1996; Mahalingam & Rodriguez, 2003),
homeless persons (e.g. Levy et al., 2002;
Somerman, 1993), overweight persons (e.g.
Biernat et al., 1996; Crandall, 1994), as well as
novel groups (e.g. Ip, Chiu, & Wan, in press;
Levy et al., 1998; Yzerbyt et al., 1998).
The goal of this Special Issue is to capture the
latest wave of research on the role of lay
theories in group and intergroup processes. In
this introduction, we describe the lay theory
approach with special attention to how research
included in this Special Issue is refining the
approach. First, we describe conceptual
parameters of lay theories. Second, we describe
advances in understanding the epistemic,
psychological, and social functions of lay
theories. Third, we spell out the far-reaching
implications of lay theories for group processes
and intergroup relations. Fourth, we discuss the
movement toward comparing and contrasting
related lay theories. 
Conceptual parameters of lay theories
Extent of overlap with scientific theories
In early theorizing, a scientist mindset was
attributed to lay theorists (e.g. Heider, 1958;
Kelly, 1955; Piaget & Garcia, 1983/1989). The
human-as-scientist metaphor highlights some
similarities between lay theories and formal
theories in science. First, lay theories, similar to
scientific theories, reduce epistemic uncertainty
by providing understanding, prediction, and
control (e.g. Heider, 1958; Hong, Levy, & Chiu,
2001; Kelly, 1955; Plaks, Grant, & Dweck, 2005;
Yzerbyt et al., 1997). Second, ‘like scientific
theories, lay theories seem to represent a struc-
tured and coherent system of beliefs, rules, and
concepts; lay theories are not simply shopping
lists of causal propositions or concepts’
(Fletcher, 1995, p. 81; also see Furnham, 1988;
Hong et al., 2001; Wegener & Petty, 1998). For
example, in this issue, Jayaratne et al. (2006,
p. 79) define a genetic lay theory as ‘an
organized belief structure reflecting the view
that genes influence, to some degree, human
traits’.
Scientific theories and lay theories also share
some content and likely influence each other.
Formal theories can inspire and give validity to
lay theories (e.g. Jayaratne et al., 2006), and lay
theories can inspire the construction of formal
theories whether explicitly, unconsciously, or
automatically (e.g. Heider, 1958; Fletcher,
1995; Furnham, 1988). As pointed out by
Fletcher (1995, p. 26), the methodologies used
by psychologists such as asking participants to
provide free-responses or ratings that later
comprise a measure of the scientist’s theory
essentially ‘build folk theory into the overarch-
ing theory, a fact that is typically mentioned in
passing or apparently going unnoticed’ (also
see Heider, 1958). Compelling parallels
between lay and scientific theories have been
suggested (see Fletcher, 1995). For example, in
this issue, Sommers and Norton (in press) dis-
cerned conceptual overlap between differing
lay theories of White racists and the distinction
drawn by psychologists between ‘old-fashioned’
racism and a modern, subtle form of bias. Also,
in this issue, Jayaratne et al. (2006) noted par-
allels between genetic lay theories and scien-
tific and public discourse on genetic
explanations for individual characteristics. In
addition, lay people subscribing to an incre-
mental theory, which focuses on mediating cir-
cumstances, appear similar to social-cognitive
theorists of personality whereas lay people sub-
scribing to an entity theory, which focuses on
fixedness of traits, appear similar to trait theor-
ists of personality (e.g. Chiu, Hong, & Dweck,
1997).
Although lay theories and formal theories
resemble each other in structure, function, and
content, lay theories are not simply lay people’s
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scientific theories. Whereas formal theories are
important epistemic tools scientists use to
approximate the truth, lay theories are
phenomenological constructions used for
everyday sense making. Accordingly, lay
theories need not be true or even easily
testable; their role in providing a perception of
truth seems most important (e.g. see Crandall,
2000; Hong et al., 2001; Yzerbyt et al., 1997).
This is not to say that lay theorists are not inter-
ested in accuracy; they just seem less likely to
put their theories to as rigorous a test as
scientists do (e.g. Plaks et al., 2005). A lay
person ‘often seeks for verification rather than
falsification’ (Furnham, 1988, p. 4) and relies
on anecdotal evidence.
Lay theories and scientific theories diverge in
other key ways, as elaborated in subsequent
sections. Lay theories are generally less explicit
and less rigorously formulated than scientific
theories. Lay theories appear to be more
blatantly self-serving than scientific theories;
they serve social and psychological functions
such as protecting the self from perceived
threats, fostering social relationships, and sup-
porting values. Using lay theories to best suit
their needs in a particular situation or over
time, lay people may subscribe to opposing lay
theories and use a single lay theory in opposite
ways.
It is also increasingly clear that lay theories
differ from one another and do not represent a
monolithic category. As discussed next, lay
theories can differ in terms of type of represen-
tation, level of articulation, frequency of activa-
tion and use, range of applicability, and degree
of universality.
Type of representation
There is a growing consensus that lay theories
are knowledge structures (Dweck, Chiu, &
Hong, 1995a, 1995b). However, there are differ-
ences in opinions on what kind of knowledge
structures lay theories are. The dialogue seems
to be centered on the gray area between
whether lay theorists are seeking and using
what they believe to be accurate theories of
their social world (ontological assumptions) or
whether they are seeking and using lay theories
that reflect their observations and experiences
(narrative representations). These two perspec-
tives on lay theories can be differentiated, as
discussed next, but, to foreshadow, are inter-
twined in that lay people may believe that lay
theories based on close observation and experi-
ence do reflect an accurate reality.
Some theorists maintain that lay theories are
lay ontological assumptions (e.g. Haslam,
Rothschild, & Ernst, 2004; Kashima et al.,
2005). As such, a lay theory is what lay people
believe to be true about certain objects, certain
properties of an object, or interrelations
between objects (broadly defined). For
example, in this issue, Haslam, Bastian, Bain,
and Kashima (2006) define essentialism as ‘a
naïve ontology positing that categories have a
deep and unobservable reality, that this reality
or “essence” gives rise to the surface features of
category members (i.e. “dispositionism”), that
it is unchanging and unchangeable by human
intervention, and that it has a “natural” basis’
(p. 64). 
Ontological assumptions can be further
broken down into subtypes. One subtype
concerns an object’s specific features, such as
group stereotypes, which may take the repre-
sentational format of what a group is like or
what prototypic traits it possesses. Examples
include lay theories of White racists (Sommers
& Norton, 2006) and of entitativity (e.g.
Demoulin, Leyens, & Yzerbyt, 2006; Denson,
Lickel, Curtis, Stenstrom, & Ames, 2006). A
second subtype concerns the nature of object
properties, which may take the representational
form of a group attribute as nonmalleable or
biologically determined. Examples are essen-
tialism or entity theories (see e.g. Demoulin
et al., 2006; Denson et al., 2006; Haslam et al.,
2006; Jayaratne et al., 2006) and essentialist
versus social contructivist theories of race
(Chao & Hong, 2005; No & Hong, 2005). A
third subtype concerns the interrelations of
objects. As examples, the genetic lay theory
suggests that genes influence traits ( Jayaratne
et al., 2006), the Protestant work ethic suggests
hard work leads to success (e.g. Levy, West,
Ramirez, & Karafantis, 2006), and a belief in a
just world suggests that people deserve what
Levy et al. lay theories
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they get and get what they deserve (e.g. Lerner,
1970; Montada, 1998). Ontological assump-
tions of the first and third subtypes carry
specific contents, whereas ontological assump-
tions of the second subtype do not. Whereas
ontological assumptions of the first subtype
pertain to what an object (or group) is like,
ontological assumptions of the third subtype
pertain to how things work or should work in a
particular context and thus contain both
descriptive and prescriptive elements.
Compared to ontological assumptions of the
first subtype, ontological assumptions of the
second subtype are higher-order assumptions.
Other scholars, by contrast, have treated lay
theories as generalized narrative representa-
tions (Ross, 1989; Wyer, 2004). For example,
Wyer (2004, p. 267) states that 
The construction of narrative representations from
new information obviously requires prior knowl-
edge about the type of persons, objects, and events
to which the information refers. This knowledge,
which often has implications for features that are
not specified in the information presented, can
sometimes include episode models of specific past
experiences that have features in common with the
new one. However, it can also consist of general-
ized narrative representations that are composed
of object and event concepts that the new infor-
mation exemplifies . . . these latter representations
often function as implicit theories that individuals
apply in comprehending new experiences and con-
struing their implications.
Examples of lay (or implicit) theories that take
the form of a generalized narrative representa-
tion include lay theories about how marital
relationships change over time (e.g. Knee,
Patrick, & Lonsbary, 2003), how intelligence and
personality develop (e.g. Chiu, Hong, & Dweck,
1994), and how people change with age (e.g.
Ross, 1989). Entity and incremental theories of
human attributes, which fit in with the second
subtype of ontological assumptions described
above, also qualify as generalized narrative rep-
resentations, according to Wyer (2004). 
As mentioned, a lay theory (entity theory of
personality) can be both an ontological assump-
tion and a narrative representation. Treating an
entity theory as an ontological assumption
draws attention to the resemblance between
this theory and other lay theories (e.g. essential-
ism) in terms of their similar consequences on
group perceptions (see Bastian & Haslam, in
press; Haslam et al., 2006). At the same time,
treating an entity theory as a narrative represen-
tation draws attention to the conceptually
driven cognitive processes that mediate the lay
theory’s construction and maintenance. Such
processes include evaluative encoding of social
information (Hong, Chiu, Dweck, & Sacks,
1997), bases of social categorization (Tong &
Chiu, 2002), and processing of trait-consistent
and inconsistent information (Plaks, Stroess-
ner, Dweck, & Sherman, 2000). 
This proposed taxonomy is not meant to be
exhaustive but rather illustrative of a theoretical
language to compare and contrast different
types of lay theories. It seems beneficial to
consider and test whether ontological assump-
tions are generalized narrative representations
and vice versa. For instance, this can help us
understand whether people believe their lay
theories to be universally true and thus apply
them in all situations and over time or whether
people believe their lay theories to have a more
limited range of application, reflecting their
specific experiences or a specific situation. Also,
greater clarification of the representational
nature of lay theories is advantageous as more
lay theories are identified and as the inter-
relation among lay theories is increasingly
outlined. 
Level of articulation
Lay theories have been characterized as ‘naïve’
(Heider, 1958), suggesting they are not rigor-
ously formulated. Also, lay theorists are thought
to not necessarily be aware of the tremendous
impact their lay theories have on their social
understanding and behavior (e.g. see Furnham,
1988; Hong et al., 2001; Wegener & Petty,
1998). 
Some lay theories, however, are more explicit
than others. For example, in this issue,
Jayaratne et al. (2006) suggest that ‘unlike most
other lay theories discussed in the psychological
literature, genetic lay theories occur within an
ongoing, scientific and public dialogue that
generates enormous controversy. In this way,
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 9(1)
8
they are more explicit than other lay theories’
(p. 79). Also, some lay theories captured by
everyday proverbs such as ‘El perico donde
quiera es verde’ (A parrot is green wherever it
goes; entity theory, see Levy, Plaks, Chiu, Hong,
& Dweck, 2001), ‘What goes around comes
around’ (belief in a just world, Lerner, 1970;
Montada, 1998) or ‘The early bird gets the
worm’ (the Protestant work ethic, see Levy et
al., 2006) are likely fairly frequently voiced.
Nonetheless, research has not tested differ-
ences between lay theories in level of articu-
lation.
Despite potential differences in level of
explicitness, lay theories generally are assessed
via self-report (see Dweck, 1999; Furnham,
1988). As illustrated by each of the articles in
this Special Issue, lay people tend to be
provided with simple, straightforward state-
ments reflecting those lay theories and appear
able to reflect and endorse their views accord-
ingly. As a shortcoming with self-report
measures, there is the concern that people
report more than they know (Nisbett & Wilson,
1977). However, studies in which people’s lay
theories are temporarily induced provide
similar findings as when the lay theories are
simply measured by self-report (e.g. Chiu,
Hong et al., 1997; Haslam & Ernst, 2002; Levy
et al., 1998, 2006; Plaks et al., 2000).
Frequency of activation and use
Lay theories are knowledge structures. There-
fore, their activation and application follow
basic principles of knowledge activation (e.g.
Higgins, 1996; Hong et al., 2001). For example,
in this issue, Haslam et al. (2006) review work
showing that entity and essentialist theories can
be successfully activated through reading brief
fictitious scientific articles supporting essential-
ism or entity (and incremental theories) and
impact responses in ways similar to when these
lay theories are simply assessed by self-report, as
just noted (e.g. Chiu, Hong et al., 1997; Haslam
& Ernst, 2002; Levy et al., 1998; Plaks et al.,
2000). Using the same methodology, in this
issue, Levy et al. (2006) had participants read a
brief article allegedly from a prestigious uni-
versity supporting or opposing the Protestant
work ethic (PWE; hard work leads to success).
Results from this experiment converged with
those of a correlational study in which partici-
pants’ reported their agreement with PWE.
When a lay theory is activated in these ways, it
is assumed that people can rather readily switch
to viewing their world through the activated lay
theory and rendering relevant judgments
because the activated lay theory is familiar to
them through previous social experiences (e.g.
Dweck et al., 1995b; Hong et al., 2001). How
long such a brief activation can last has not
been tested for these lay theories.
Lay theories that are frequently activated,
however, are expected to become chronically
accessible (Dweck et al., 1995b; Hong et al.,
2001) and become a possession (Abelson,
1986). The stability of lay theories, however,
tends to be assumed or implied rather than
formally tested. For example, as noted in the
section on degree of universality of lay theories,
lay theories are prevalent in some cultures and
thus may be more stable in some environments.
In this issue, Levy et al. (2006) suggest that
the PWE and other lay theories with more than
one intergroup meaning in a given culture may
be especially stable across situations and over
time. Because people can use the same lay
theory (e.g. PWE) to support tolerance or
intolerance across a wide variety of contexts,
‘they do not need to give up the lay theory
when the social implications are not relevant or
appropriate in a particular context’ (Levy et al.,
p. 112). 
In addressing issues of stability, prior work as
well as work in this Special Issue has also
implied that lay theories and intergroup pro-
cesses are mutually sustaining. That is,
numerous lay theories have been shown to lead
to particular intergroup attitudes and behav-
iors, in addition to being influenced by inter-
group experiences and other contextual
variables. There is some indirect evidence that
the entity theory and stereotyping are mutually
sustaining. Levy et al. (1998) showed that acti-
vating the entity theory activated greater
stereotyping while Hong et al.’s (1999)
findings suggest that greater exposure to
stereotypes in the mass media contributed to
Levy et al. lay theories
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greater agreement with the entity lay theory.
Moreover, in this issue, Jayaratne et al. (2006)
seem to suggest that discussions of genetic
explanations in the mass media can reinforce
prejudiced attitudes and vice versa. Further-
more, Sommers’s and Norton’s (2006) theoriz-
ing in this issue seems to suggest that for some
Whites, their lay theories of White racists and
behavior toward African Americans are
mutually sustaining; they behave in ‘racist’ ways
but define White racism in a way that excludes
that behavior and thus continue their ‘racist’
behavior and so forth.
Research, then, shows that lay theories may
be activated and deactivated in particular situa-
tions and contexts. Although theorized to also
be relatively stable and part of mutually sustain-
ing cycles with intergroup processes, little
research has directly addressed these issues.
Range of applicability
Lay theories are thought to have a definite
range of application or convenience (e.g. Kelly,
1955). Some theories are general while others
are narrow. As examples, lay theories can be
specific to the intergroup domain and to a par-
ticular group such as lay theories of White
racists (Sommers & Norton, 2006), or broader
and apply to the intergroup domain as well as
to self and interpersonal domains such as
theories about the malleability of human attrib-
utes (Dweck, 1999; Dweck et al., 1995a; also see
Haslam et al., 2006). Broad and pervasive lay
theories likely impact a wide range of group
processes and behaviors across many situations
and over time. More specific lay theories likely
have a narrower range of use, but nonetheless
may be powerful predictors of intergroup pro-
cesses and behavior within the theory’s range of
applicability.
Nevertheless, a lay theory derives its impact
not only from its literal meanings, but also from
the inferences it affords and its implications for
social practices. Some lay theories have one set
of commonly accepted meanings whereas
others have two or more meanings. For
example, the entitativity theory may entail the
presence of common traits and a high level of
homogeneity in the group, or alternatively the
presence of common goals and high levels of
group cohesiveness (e.g. Brewer, Hong, & Li,
2004; Ip et al., in press). When a lay theory pos-
sesses dual meanings, the presence of contex-
tual cues may evoke one or the other meaning
(presence of common skin color among group
members evokes the homogeneity sense of
entitativity, whereas presence of common
actions among group members evokes the
cohesiveness sense of the same theory),
pushing group inferences in one or the other
direction (Ip et al., in press). 
Several studies reported in this Special Issue
illustrate how a lay theory’s meanings can
change with experience and context such that
a lay theory can have two opposing intergroup
meanings (see Levy, West, & Ramirez, in press).
For example, in this issue, Jayaratne et al.
(2006), using a representative sample of US
Whites, showed that genetic lay theories
support prejudice toward Blacks but tolerance
toward gay men and lesbians (also see Haslam
et al., 2002; Haslam & Levy, in press). Addition-
ally, in this issue, Sommers and Norton (2006)
uncovered multiple components to lay theories
of White racism: one component focuses on
‘subtle, ambiguous forms of bias, and attributes
racism to intrinsic antecedents such as political
ideology’ and another narrower component
focuses on external characteristics of White
racists and ‘seems to be a more context-
dependent conceptualization, in which people
consider mitigating nonracial factors that could
account for potentially biased behavior’
(p. 132). Furthermore, in this issue, Levy et al.
(2006) showed that although the Protestant
work ethic is associated with intolerance among
US White adults (as past work has shown), it
also is associated with egalitarianism among US
children and early adolescents. 
Degree of universality
Some lay theories are more widely shared or
distributed in a given population. For instance,
similar ratings of the entitativity of groups are
reported from the United States and Poland
(Lickel et al., 2000). Further, entity and incre-
mental theories appear to relate to group per-
ception in consistent ways in Australia, Hong
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 9(1)
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Kong, and the US (e.g. Bastian & Haslam, in
press; Hong et al., 2004; Levy et al., 1998) and
also among US adults and children (e.g.
Karafantis & Levy, 2004; Levy & Dweck, 1999;
Levy et al., 1998). Gender differences are rarely
mentioned in this work.
At the same time, researchers have uncov-
ered national differences in the way lay theories
operate across and within nations (e.g. Morris,
Menon, & Ames, 2001; Yzerbyt, Corneille, &
Estrada, 2001). For instance, pertaining to
essentialism, Mahalingam and Rodriquez
(2003) showed that Indian men higher up in
the caste system adhere more strongly to an
essentialist view of women, compared to North
Americans and other Indians. Kashima et al.
(2005) reported stronger belief in group
agency in East Asian countries or regions than
in countries with a dominant European cultural
tradition (Australia, Belgium, Germany, UK,
US). Although entity theory of personality is
equally popular in Hong Kong and the US (e.g.
Chiu, Dweck, Tong, & Fu, 1997), entity theory
of society and its institutions is more widely dis-
tributed in Hong Kong than in the US (Chiu &
Hong, 1999; Chiu, Dweck, et al., 1997). This
pattern of differences reflects the relatively
more widespread belief in the US that society
can be changed to accommodate the individ-
ual, and a relatively more popular belief in
Hong Kong that individuals can change them-
selves to fit in with a fixed world (Chiu, Morris,
Hong, & Menon, 2000; Menon, Morris, Chiu, &
Hong, 1999; Su et al., 1999). 
Cross-national comparison also reveals differ-
ences in the meaning of lay theories. PWE does
not necessarily have the same intergroup
significance in all cultures (e.g. Crandall &
Martinez, 1996). In a study of Colombians of
age groups similar to those investigated by Levy
et al. (2006) in this issue, Levy, Ramirez, and
Velilla (2005) found that PWE has a predomi-
nately egalitarian meaning; that is, it does not
appear to have the justifier of inequality
meaning among Colombians. 
Within-nation work also reveals variations in
the way certain lay theories are understood and
used. For example, as mentioned, in studies of
essentialism, Mahalingam and Rodriguez
(2003) found significant social class differences
in the tendency to essentialize the female
gender. A lay theory also may have a different
meaning depending on the ethnicity of the lay
theorist. Following up on Levy et al.’s (2006)
findings in this issue, Levy et al. (2005) found
that PWE has a predominately egalitarian
meaning among US Black and Latino adults
while it additionally has a justifier of inequality
meaning among US White adults. Although
PWE (hard work leads to success) suggests a
positive pathway to success for all members of
society, it also can be utilized by relatively
advantaged group members to justify the status
quo. Likewise, No and Hong (2005) found that
endorsement of a theory of fixed race (i.e. the
belief that race is biologically determined and
immutable) is positively related to social domi-
nance orientation and symbolic racism among
White Americans, but not among Asian Ameri-
cans, possibly because the theory of fixed race
has different significations among numerical
majority and minority groups in the US. To
White Americans, the theory legitimates their
dominance, whereas to Asian Americans, the
theory reminds them of an impermeable inter-
group boundary and the obstacles to social
mobility (see also Chao & Hong, 2005). 
Studies examining children’s lay theories
relevant to intergroup relations have tended to
examine how early the lay theories emerge and
have not uncovered age differences in the use
of lay theories (e.g. Gelman, 2003; Hirschfeld,
1995). Research on entity and incremental
theories with younger participants tends to
replicate work with adults showing that the lay
theories emerge early in life and are used in the
same way across age groups (see Levy et al.,
2001). Yet, in this issue, Levy et al. (2006)
showed that PWE appears to function differ-
ently for White Americans of different ages.
Compared to older groups (college age and
adult community), who seem to have the flexi-
bility to use either the egalitarian meaning or
justifier of inequality meaning of PWE, younger
groups (10- to 15-year-olds) seem to use the
egalitarian meaning of the Protestant work
ethic more often. The justifier of inequality
meaning of PWE is probably less pervasive in
Levy et al. lay theories
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the environments of young children, and
children unlikely are as motivated as adults to
use the justifier of inequality meaning of PWE.
To summarize this section on conceptual
parameters of lay theories, it is increasingly
clear that lay theories do not fall into a mono-
lithic category. All people have some sort of
lay theories; yet, level of endorsement of a lay
theory or use of a particular meaning of a
lay theory can vary across populations and
contexts. When a lay theory or its meaning is
widely shared in a particular group, it becomes
a symbolic element in the group’s shared reality
or cultural worldview. The theory would likely
be referenced frequently in everyday communi-
cation, and its meaning would likely be
embodied in the group social, political, and
educational institutions (e.g. Kashima, 2000;
Lau, Chiu, & Lee, 2001; Lau, Lee, & Chiu,
2004). The theory will also be accorded with
higher validity (e.g. Sechrist & Stangor, 2001),
and become particularly useful for reducing
epistemic uncertainty (e.g. Kruglanski, Shah,
Pierro, & Mannetti, 2002) and existential
anxiety (e.g. Halloran & Kashima, 2004). Such
functions are elaborated in the next section. 
Functions of lay theories
Guided by an intuitive scientist metaphor, lay
theories are thought to function primarily as
providing epistemic functions (e.g. for reviews,
see Fletcher, 1995; Furnham, 1988; Hong et al.,
2001; McGarty, Yzerbyt, & Spears, 2002;
Wegener & Petty, 1998). Lay theories are
increasingly being shown to also serve import-
ant psychological and social functions.
Understanding and simplification
In their original operationalization, lay theories
were expected to provide understanding and
simplification akin to scientific theories
(Heider, 1958; Kelly, 1955; Piaget & Garcia,
1983/1989). Indeed, lay theories have been
referred to as sense-making (e.g. McGarty,
et al., 2002; Yzerbyt et al., 1997) and meaning
systems (e.g. Chiu, Dweck, et al., 1997; Dweck &
Leggett, 1988; McGarty et al., 2002). Relatedly,
lay theories are thought to simplify one’s social
world by imposing ‘psychologically meaningful
constraints on the infinite variety of interpret-
ations available for a particular stimulus or
event (Levy et al., 2001, p. 157, see Chiu et al.,
2000; Demoulin et al., 2006; McGarty et al.,
2002). 
Additionally, offering a ready explanatory
framework, a lay theory can be used to make
relatively quick group judgments, and prior
work shows that lay theories are indeed used
when perceivers are under cognitive load (e.g.
Knowles, Morris, Chiu, & Hong, 2001) or time
pressure (e.g. Chiu et al., 2000). The lay
theories of White racism described by Sommers
and Norton (2006) in this issue seem an especi-
ally good candidate for conserving cognitive
energy. People can use their lay theory of White
racism to take stock of others, making quick
judgments of whether someone is racist or not
and then taking action accordingly. 
Control
A sense of psychological control often accom-
panies reduction of epistemic uncertainty. Lay
theories as explanatory frameworks on how the
world works or should work likely provide lay
perceivers with a sense of control over their
outcomes. Entity and incremental theories can
provide lay theorists with a sense of control over
their intergroup relations. People holding an
entity theory likely gain a sense of control by
sizing up which groups are ‘good’ versus ‘bad’
and thus which should be approached versus
avoided (Hong et al., 2004). People holding an
incremental theory, that people can change,
likely feel a sense of control in their personal
ability and ability of intervening circumstances
to alter poor intergroup relations. Likewise,
people who endorse PWE can feel a sense of
control that by putting forth sufficient effort,
they will achieve success (see e.g. Lied &
Pritchard, 1976). Also, according to the belief
in a just world, a lay perceiver can insure
positive outcomes through good behavior (e.g.
Lerner, 1970; Montada, 1998). In addition,
members of more advantaged groups may gain
a sense of control by subscribing to lay theories
such as belief in a just world (e.g. Montada,
1998), PWE (Levy et al., 2006), and genetic
lay theories (e.g. Jayaratne et al., 2006)
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especially when they are used to justify and
maintain their relatively advantaged place in
society. 
Experiences and accuracy
Lay theories may serve people’s needs to label
their observations and to see their experiences
as reflecting a correct social reality. As noted
earlier, some lay theories may represent narra-
tive representations (Wyer, 2004). As such, lay
theories may reflect people’s observations and
experiences and additionally seem to reflect an
accurate view of one’s social world. Although
lay theories confer feelings of understanding
and predictability, as noted earlier, they
unlikely reflect an accurate picture of the
world. Indeed, unlike scientific theories, they
are unlikely put to a rigorous test for accuracy
plus lay perceivers often hold conflicting lay
theories. Nonetheless, people need to label
their observations and experiences and to see
their experiences as reflecting a correct social
reality. The pervasive nature of certain lay
theories and the process of people observing
confirmatory evidence (see Fletcher, 1995 for a
review) and communicating their lay theories
to one another may create a sense of legitimacy
and ‘realness’ to lay theories (e.g. Kashima,
2004). 
Additionally, perceivers often attribute high
levels of validity to lay theories that align with
popular beliefs in the group (Sechrist &
Stangor, 2001) or in line with authority or
scientific theories. Also, lay theories that appear
to be closely in line with scientific theories may
seem to fulfill needs for accurate observation of
one’s world. For example, in this issue,
Jayarante et al. (2006) note that ‘genetic lay
theories parallel high-profile scientific discover-
ies that can have special standing as “valid”
theories’ (p. 79). Furthermore, lay theories
perceived to be characteristic of a group are
often used to define the prototype of the group
(Hogg, 2004). 
Social utility
Lay theories also seem to serve the additional
function of social utility as they are not held by
a single individual; indeed, this is why they are
referred to as ‘common sense’ theories (e.g. see
Fletcher, 1995). Lay theories can be quite per-
vasive in a given environment, as reviewed
earlier, and hence are exchanged and shared by
others in one’s environment (e.g. see Fletcher,
1995; Furnham, 1988; McGarty et al., 2002).
Shared lay theories, being integral parts of a
group’s shared socialization, have the potential
to foster and maintain social relationships,
express one’s identification with the group (e.g.
Jetten, Postmes, & Mcauliffe, 2002), and satisfy
the need for belongingness (e.g. Castano,
Yzerbyt, Paladina, & Sacchi, 2002; Pickett,
Bonner, & Coleman, 2002).
Values 
As noted earlier, some lay theories can have
both descriptive and prescriptive elements, for
example, the third subtype of ontological
assumptions. Therefore, some lay theories can
be seen as fulfilling important values and
serving as action guides. For example, PWE,
in its prescriptive form, suggests that people
should work hard and additionally, in its
original form, included a disdain for leisure
(Weber, 1904–1905/1958). Likewise, the belief
in a just world, in its prescriptive form suggests
that good deeds will be rewarded (e.g. see
Stevens & Fiske, 1995). As captured by proverbs
relevant to the just world belief, ‘What goes
around comes around’; therefore, ‘treat others
as you would like to be treated’. The colorblind
theory that race differences are superficial,
irrelevant, and uninformative bases to make
judgments of people (e.g. Richeson &
Nussbaum, 2004) suggests the prescription that
people should be treated equally, thereby
fitting with core values of numerous countries
including the US (e.g. Kluegel & Smith, 1986).
Self- and group-protection
Finally, articles in this Special Issue highlight
that people may use lay theories to justify their
intergroup attitudes and prevailing social
inequalities (also see Jost & Major, 2001;
Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Specifically, people
may use lay theories to justify their preexisting
(high or low) levels of prejudice (e.g. Crandall,
2000; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; McGarty et al.,
Levy et al. lay theories
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2002; Yzerbyt et al., 1997). As one example, in
this issue, Jayarante et al. (2006) note that
‘genetic lay theories act as a rationale for
reducing hostility toward gay men and lesbians
for what is generally considered socially-
unacceptable behavior’ (p. 82; Haslam & Levy,
in press; also see Keller, 2005). Furthermore, in
this issue, Denson et al. (2006) noted that lay
theories of groups such as entitativity and essen-
tialism can be used to justify collective blaming
and retaliating against group members who do
not have a strong connection to an event that
preceded the intergroup conflict.
Sommers and Norton (2006, p. 119), in this
issue, also proposed that in the face of ‘the
uniquely polarizing and controversial nature of
ideas about race (. . .) people’s theories of
racism tend to be constructed in ways that allow
them to maintain a safe distance from any
appearance of personal bias’. Similarly in this
issue, Levy et al. (in press) noted that the justi-
fier of inequality meaning was especially fitting
to the relatively advantaged White participants
in their studies. PWE also more generally
confers self-esteem to those with positive
outcomes (e.g. Quinn & Crocker, 1999).
Likewise, a belief in a just world can confer
positive self-regard for the more socially and
economically advantaged (e.g. Dzuka &
Dalbert, 2002; Hunt, 2000).
Taken together, lay theories serve important
cognitive, social, and psychological functions
for perceivers. Some lay theories may serve all
these functions and other lay theories predom-
inately one (e.g. Fletcher, 1995; Furnham,
1988). Some lay people hold opposing lay
theories (e.g. Dweck et al., 1995a; Furnham,
1988), affording them the opportunity to utilize
the one that best suits their needs in a given
situation. Despite a long-standing functional
analysis of lay theories, the functions of lay
theories are generally assumed or implied
rather than directly tested. More research is
needed on functions, and research included in
this Special Issue seems to be heading in the
direction of more directly studying the func-
tions of lay theories.
Implications of lay theories for group
processes and intergroup relations
There are numerous types of groups, and
research by Lickel and colleagues (Lickel et al.,
2000, 2001) reveals that lay perceivers roughly
distinguish between four types of groups:
intimacy groups (e.g. friends), social categories
(e.g. gender, race), task groups (e.g. co-
workers), and loose associations (e.g. people
waiting in a line). Nonetheless, most of the
research has focused on positive and negative
effects that lay theories have on social
categories. Below, we provide a brief and
limited review of the impact of lay theories on
ingroups and outgroups.
Implications for ingroups
Lay theories have numerous positive benefits
for individuals (e.g. providing understanding,
meaning, simplification, and prediction) as well
as for their groups. Shared lay theories may
help foster and maintain intragroup relations
through increased ingroup identification (e.g.
see Castano, 2004) and greater attributions to
shared human emotions (e.g. Leyens et al.,
2001). In addition, lay theories may help group
members collectively enjoy positive outcomes
and keep negative ones at a distance, as noted
earlier. As examples, lay theories can bolster the
self-esteem of group members who are experi-
encing positive outcomes (e.g. PWE, Quinn &
Crocker, 1999; belief in a just world, Montada,
1998), allow group members to maintain a
positive image of themselves despite prejudice
(e.g. lay theories of White racism, Sommers &
Norton, 2006), and help justify one’s group’s
relatively advantaged societal position (e.g.
PWE, Levy et al., 2006).
Lay theories additionally may have negative
effects on ingroup members, although evidence
is limited. As one exception, Lickel, Schmader,
Curtis, Scarnier, and Ames (2005) showed that
the more interdependent (or entitatively)
people viewed their group, the more they
experienced vicarious guilt for a wrong-doing.
In this issue, Denson et al. (2006) further noted
that viewing one’s group as highly entitative
could lead to greater punishment of the
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ingroup wrongdoer. A lay theory could also
conflict with self and group interests when it is
too rigidly applied in intergroup contexts. For
instance, a group leader rigidly viewing a group
as highly entitative might refuse to negotiate
with a benevolent outgroup because a few
members behaved in an undesirable way on
one occasion. As another example, group
members rigidly adhering to an incremental
theory may delay forming a negative impression
and taking action against an otherwise clearly
threatening outgroup. In addition, perceivers
might hold onto a lay theory that does not serve
their ingroup interests because the lay theory is
prevalent in their culture and, hence, difficult
to reject (e.g. see Jost & Major, 2001). 
Implications for outgroups
Some lay theories foster positive intergroup
relations. As one example, an incremental
(relative to an entity) theory has been shown to
have mainly positive implications for outgroup
perception, judgment, and behavior. People
holding an incremental (vs. entity) theory tend
to form weaker negative outgroup impressions
that take into account context-sensitive factors
(e.g. Hong et al., 2004; Levy & Dweck, 1999)
and that are updated in the face of disconfirm-
ing evidence (e.g. Plaks et al., 2000). Thus, per-
ceivers with an incremental (vs. entity) theory
in mind are reluctant to take action against
outgroup members who behaved undesirably
on one or two occasions (e.g. Levy & Dweck,
1999) and provide greater help to groups who
are socially stigmatized (e.g. Karafantis & Levy,
2004).
In contrast, an entity theory has been por-
trayed as a lay theory having mostly negative
intergroup implications. Individuals operating
under an entity theory framework tend to look
for evidence of the expression of negative traits
in the behaviors of outgroup members, includ-
ing evidence that confirms knowledge of
societal stereotypes (e.g. Eberhardt, Dasgupta,
& Banaszynski, 2003; Plaks et al., 2000). Per-
ceivers holding an entity (vs. incremental)
theory also generate more trait attributions for
group members’ behaviors (e.g. Levy & Dweck,
1999; Levy et al., 1998), have a greater tendency
to use evaluative traits to categorize individuals
(Tong & Chiu, 2002), perceive greater within-
group variance and between-group commonal-
ties (e.g. Levy & Dweck, 1999; Levy et al., 1998),
make more extreme trait judgments of racial,
ethnic, occupational, and unfamilar groups
(Bastian & Haslam, in press; Levy & Dweck,
1999; Levy et al., 1998), exhibit greater preju-
dice toward recent immigrants or racial minori-
ties (Hong et al., 2004), report less willingness
to socialize with others who exhibited a few
negative and neutral behaviors (e.g. Levy &
Dweck, 1999), and provide less help for disad-
vantaged others (Karafantis & Levy, 2004). 
Research on entity and incremental theories
also shows that their use depends on the cultural
context and lay perceiver, as noted earlier.
Increasingly, however, many other lay theories
are being shown to have mixed implications for
intergroup relations, fostering positive or
negative outgroup implications depending on
the lay perceiver, target group, and context (e.g.
Levy, West, & Ramirez, in press). For example,
essentialism has been found to be related to
greater dispositional judgments (e.g. Yyzerbyt et
al., 1997, 2001), greater anti-gay attitudes (e.g.
Haslam et al., 2002; Haslam & Levy, in press),
and seeing outgroups as less human (e.g.
Paladino, Vaes, Castano, Demoulin, & Leyens, in
press). At the same time, essentialism in some
forms is related to more positive attitudes toward
gay men and lesbians (e.g. Haslam et al., 2002;
Haslam & Levy, in press).
Relatedly, in this issue, Jayaratne et al. (2006)
showed that US Whites holding genetic lay
theories would be concerned if their (hypothet-
ical) child dated or married an African
American, and Keller (2005) showed that a
belief in genetic determinism was related to
greater sexism and racism. However, in this
issue, Jayaratne et al. (2006) showed that the
more lay perceivers endorsed a genetic theory
to account for differences in sexual orientation,
the less bothered they were that their (hypo-
thetical) son or daughter was homosexual.
In a similar vein, on one hand, highly entita-
tive groups compared to low entitative groups
are evaluated more strongly with more implicit
intragroup comparison (e.g. Pickett, 2001) and
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greater attributions to negative dispositions
(e.g. Abelson, Dasgupta, Park, & Banaji, 1998;
Dasgupta, Banaji, & Abelson, 1999; McConnell,
Sherman, & Hamilton, 1997; Yzerbyt et al.,
1997, 1998). Highly entitative groups also
receive greater levels of collective responsibility
for negative acts including murder (e.g. Denson
et al., 2006; Lickel, Schmader, & Hamilton,
2003). On the other hand, McConnell and col-
leagues (e.g. McConnell et al., 1997) have
shown that people engage in more effortful and
elaborative information processing of highly
entitative groups, and hence strong arguments
of highly entitative groups are viewed as more
persuasive, leading to greater attitude change
(Rydell & McConnell, 2005).
For a lay theory with more than one inter-
group meaning, the context may set the stage
for which meaning is used. For example, when
the ‘justifying disadvantage’ aspect of the PWE
and belief in a just world is salient, these lay
theories have negative effects on disadvantaged
outgroups and their members. Endorsement of
PWE has been shown to relate to stronger
negative attitudes toward African Americans
(e.g. Katz & Hass, 1988; also see Biernat et al.,
1996), dislike of overweight persons (e.g.
Crandall, 1994), negative attitudes toward
homeless persons (e.g. Levy et al., 2002;
Somerman, 1993), negative affect toward
people facing AIDS (e.g. Levy et al., 2002), less
desired social distance toward African Ameri-
cans (e.g. Levy et al., 2006), opposition to a
community facility for homeless families (e.g.
Somerman, 1993), and less donated money to a
homeless shelter (e.g. Levy et al., 2006). Lay
perceivers holding the just world belief tend to
exhibit negative affect toward victims (e.g. ficti-
tious female alleged victim of gender discrimi-
nation, Jost & Burgess, 2000) and blame people
for their plights (e.g. rape victims, people facing
AIDS and homelessness, cancer patients; e.g.
Montada, 1998). Yet, when the egalitarian
aspect of PWE is salient, it attenuates intergroup
animosity and is associated with reported egali-
tarianism and desired social closeness to African
Americans (Levy et al., 2006). Likewise, the
belief in a just world, should lead to fair treat-
ment of others in some circumstances when its
prescriptive form (good deeds will be
rewarded) is salient (e.g. see Stevens & Fiske,
1995). 
It is important to highlight that lay theories
have not only been associated with numerous
indicators of intergroup relations, but lay
theories are powerful predictors of these indi-
cators, explaining a large proportion of the
variance (e.g. Haslam et al., 2002). Some
studies, have shown that lay theories are even
more powerful predictors than relevant person-
ality and cognitive variables. For example, Levy
et al. (1998) showed that entity theory (relative
to incremental theory) predicted ethnic and
occupational stereotyping independently of
individual difference variables (e.g. right-wing
authoritarianism, need for cognitive closure,
attributional complexity, need to evaluate) and
also its unique predictive contribution was
larger than each of them. Similarly, Bastian and
Haslam (in press) showed that essentialism
(with a measure including some entity theory
items) predicted stereotyping independent of
and more strongly than the same individual
variables including social dominance orien-
tation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle,
1994).
In summary, the implications of lay theories
for ingroups and especially outgroups are
extensive. Yet, there does not appear to be a
simple relation between a lay theory and toler-
ance or intolerance; the implications depend
on the target group, context, and lay perceiver.
This underscores the proposition that lay
theories are not a monolithic theoretical con-
struct. This also suggests that utilizing lay
theories as part of a prejudice reduction effort
(e.g. highlighting a lay theory with egalitarian
implications) would require a consideration of
the interplay between the lay perceivers’ needs,
the context, and the target group. 
Interrelations among lay theories
With the abundance of research on lay theories
and group processes, researchers have begun to
compare and contrast seemingly related lay
theories and take steps toward a synthesis. A
prominent example, as highlighted in this
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Special Issue, is work on several complementary
lay theories generally concerning the extent to
which human groups are seen as having a core,
underlying, fixed, or essential qualities or that
groups and their members are malleable and
vary across time and situations, including work
on entatitivity (e.g. Brewer & Harasty, 1996;
Brewer et al., 2004; Demoulin et al., 2006;
Denson et al., 2006; Hamilton & Sherman,
1996; Haslam et al., 2000; Lickel et al., 2000;
McGarty, Haslam, Hutchinson, & Grace, 1995;
Yzerbyt et al., 2004), essentialism (e.g.
Demoulin et al., 2006; Denson et al., 2006;
Haslam et al., 2000, 2006, Rothbart & Taylor,
1992; Yzerbyt et al., 1997), entity versus incre-
mental theories (e.g. Dweck et al., 1995a;
Haslam et al., 2006; Levy et al., 1998), and
genetic lay theories (e.g. Jayaratne et al., 2006;
also see Keller, 2005). 
Indeed, these lay theories share not only con-
ceptual overlap but predictive validity as
reviewed in the previous section. Accordingly,
there is a growing agreement to work toward
integrating this work, as exemplified by a
recent, substantial edited volume on the topic
(Yzerbyt et al., 2004) as well as by articles in this
Special Issue. Facilitating the exploration of the
overlap, some laboratories are working toward
common definitions of each of these lay
theories and, thus, using similar measures of
them (e.g. Bastian & Haslam, in press;
Demoulin et al., 2006; Haslam et al., 2006). At
the same time, as illustrated in this Special
Issue, researchers are using multiple measures
of each lay theory across studies and showing
that variations in the operationalization of the
lay theory does not necessarily alter the pattern
of findings (e.g. Demoulin et al., 2006; Denson
et al., 2006). 
This is not to imply that there is agreement
on whether entity, entitativity, essentialism, or
genetic lay theories are distinct lay theories or
whether one or more of them is a broader lay
theory including one or more of the others.
There does appear to be a consensus that
entitativity and natural kinds (or inalterability;
a form of essentialism) are separate, albeit
related, lay theories or subcomponents (e.g.
Haslam et al., 2000; Yzerbyt et al., 2001; also see
Rothbart & Taylor, 1992). In this issue, Denson
et al.’s (2006) work on collective responsibility
judgments suggests that entitativity and essen-
tialism (defined as inalterability or natural
kinds) are separate lay theories. Also in this
issue, Demoulin et al. (2006) showed that
forced choice categories (e.g. race, gender)
tend to be viewed as natural kinds whereas
social choice categories (e.g. major course of
study, political party affiliation) tend to be
viewed in terms of their entitativity. However,
when essentialism is defined more broadly, enti-
tativity and natural kinds tend to be considered
subcomponents of essentialism (e.g. Demoulin
et al., 2006; Haslam et al. 2000). So, one
burning question is how broadly to define
essentialism and, relatedly, is it the overriding
lay theory of this group of related constructs?
There are also remaining questions about
how to best define entitativity and natural
kinds. For example, in this issue, Demoulin
et al. (2006) defined entitativity in a rather
broad way, including common goals, common
fate, similarity, groupness, interaction, informa-
tiveness, and importance, dimensions drawn
from prior measures (Haslam et al., 2000;
Lickel et al., 2000; also see Dasgupta et al.,
1999). Also in this issue, Denson et al. (2006,
Study 2) in one study defined entitativity in a
broad, albeit slightly different way (uniformity,
informativeness, exclusivity, interaction,
common goals), drawing from similar prior
measures (Haslam et al., 2000; Lickel et al.,
2003). Denson et al. (2006, Study 1) in a differ-
ent study, showed that defining entitativity in a
more narrow way as ‘interdependence’ (inter-
action, behavioral influence, norms, interper-
sonal bonds, shared knowledge, common goals,
e.g. Lickel et al., 2000) did not significantly
alter the pattern of findings. Other recent
research, though, has found entitativity to
consist of two distinct components: perceived
homogeneity and perceived cohesiveness or
agency (e.g. Brewer et al., 2004; Ip et al., in
press; Kashima et al., 2005), and thus synthesiz-
ing definitions of entitativity is still underway.
Regarding natural kinds, Haslam and col-
leagues (Haslam et al., 2006; also see Bastian &
Haslam, in press) in this issue suggest that
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entity theory is part of a natural kinds factor of
essentialism because both concern ‘immuta-
bility’. Using items from an entity theory scale
used in prior work (e.g. Levy et al., 1998),
Bastian and Haslam (in press) showed that that
natural kinds items and entity items were inter-
correlated and further that the entity items
loaded on a factor including biological basis,
informativeness, and discreteness. Also, the
entity theory dimension did not outperform
the other three dimensions (biological basis,
informativeness, discreteness) in terms of
stereotype endorsement although it did out-
perform them in terms of predicting innate
explanations for stereotypes. 
Immutability has not only received special
attention through the study of natural kinds or
entity theory (vs. incremental theory), but also
by two relatively newer lay theories. For
example, Keller (2005) introduced a belief in
genetic determinism (biological component of
essentialism) and found it to be significantly
correlated with an entity theory and an entita-
tivity index (Haslam et al.’s, 2000, measure),
although marginally related to a natural kinds
index (Haslam et al.’s, 2000, measure). In a
similar vein, in this issue, Jayaratne et al. (2006)
introduced genetic lay theories, noting concep-
tual overlap to essentialism (namely natural
kinds dimension), entity theory, and belief in
genetic determinism. It remains to be tested
the extent to which an entity theory, belief in
genetic determinism, and genetic lay theories
overlap with one another and whether they are
encompassed by essentialism more generally
(e.g. Haslam et al., 2006) or are better
viewed as distinct from other aspects of essen-
tialism. 
Although efforts to synthesize research on
conceptually related lay theories has focused on
the lay theories just mentioned, other lay
theories relevant to group processes share con-
ceptual overlap. For example, PWE and belief
in a just world converge in suggesting that
outcomes are determined by an individual’s
behavior. The belief in a just world suggests that
an individual who does good deeds will reap
benefits, and PWE suggests that an individual
who works hard will achieve success. Just world
belief focusing on the ‘world’ is more general
than PWE, which is a more narrowly confined
context of ‘work’. As reviewed in the above
section, PWE and just world belief share predic-
tive validity, and there is empirical evidence for
their conceptual overlap (e.g. Furnham & Raja-
manickam, 1992). More work is needed on
these similar lay theories.
To summarize, researchers have identified
sets of complementary lay theories predicting
similar group processes. Accordingly,
researchers are refining their conceptualiza-
tions of individual lay theories and working
toward distinguishing them. The substantial
conceptual and predictive overlap between lay
theories suggests that they are part of an associ-
ative network and likely collectively influence
group and intergroup processes. 
Conclusion
Research on lay theories and intergroup
relations, broadly defined, is rapidly growing.
The contributors to this Special Issue on the
topic include international scholars from differ-
ent intellectual traditions cutting across social,
cognitive, personality, developmental, and
cultural psychology. Their work showcases the
latest developments in this area while also sug-
gesting fruitful future directions of research. 
Articles in this issue contribute to a more
refined definition of lay theories. Lay theories
have traditionally been discussed as lay people’s
scientific theories. Recent work confirms simi-
larities between scientific theories and lay
theories while also shedding light on some key
differences between them. Lay theories share
structural and functional qualities as well as
content with scientific theories. However,
unlike scientific theories, lay theories need not
be objective, testable, or true. Lay theories may
be adopted to serve the self and to justify the
state of affairs. 
In addition, this research suggests that lay
theories are not monolithic. They differ in
terms of type of representation, level of articu-
lation, frequency of activation and use, range of
applicability, and degree of universality. There-
fore, it has becoming increasingly pressing to
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consider the similarities and differences among
lay theories. For that reason, researchers are
comparing and contrasting seemingly related
lay theories. The identification of lay theories
relevant to intergroup relations will likely
continue in parallel and in connection to a
movement toward synthesizing related lay
theories into a smaller set.
Furthermore, as research on lay theories con-
tinues to blossom, the positive and negative
implications of lay theories for ingroups and
outgroups continue to be defined. Lay theories
seem to serve perceivers and their ingroups by
serving epistemic needs as well as social and
psychological needs, although more work is
needed directly testing the functions of lay
theories. Lay theories can also have positive
implications for outgroups. Nevertheless, a host
of negative implications for outgroups as a
function of perceivers’ lay theories, have been
identified, in keeping with the goal of many
researchers who study lay theories as a vehicle
for understanding intergroup conflict. Lay
theories play a detrimental role in intergroup
relations beginning with how outgroup infor-
mation is encoded and processed and extend-
ing to negative affect, negative attributions,
stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination.
In conclusion, research continues to mount
showing that people of all backgrounds use lay
theories as key filters for a wide range of group
processes across many types of intergroup
relations and in countless environments. We
look forward to the next wave of research in
this area that moves us toward a fuller under-
standing of the nature of lay theories, while also
contributing to a fuller understanding of the
dynamics of intergroup relations. 
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